

So the argument seems to be that if we want this experiment to succeed, we should not put it in unnecessary jeopardy.

Mr. GRAHAM. I will add, if I may, the 3,000 number does not allow the missions that are obvious to most everybody who has looked at Iraq to be performed in a successful manner. That is the bottom line. That is why no one has thrown out 3,000 before. Can you do it with 10,000? That is where you are pushing the envelope. The Kurdish-Arab boundary dispute almost went hot. This new plan we have come up with to integrate the Peshmurga, the Iraqi security forces with some Americans, will pay dividends over time. Mr. President, 5,000 is what the American commander said he needed to continue that plan. We have a plan to even wind down that number. It is just going to take a while. When it comes to Iraq, I can tell you right now I would not want our American civilians to be without some American military support, given what I know is coming to Iraq from Iran.

Mr. MCCAIN. Could I mention one fundamental here? The question is: Is it in the United States national security interest to have these 10,000-plus American troops carrying out the missions we just described or is it not? If it is, then it is pure sophistry to say: Well, we would only consider this if the Iraqis requested it. If we are waiting for the Iraqis to request it, then it means it doesn't matter whether the United States is there.

I think the three of us and others—including General Odierno, General Petraeus, and the most respected military and civilian leadership—think it is in our national interest. The way this should have happened is the United States and the Iraqis sitting down together, once coming to an agreement, making a joint announcement that it is in both countries' national security interest. If it is not, then we should not send one single American there, not one.

Mr. GRAHAM. If the Senator will yield for a second, that is a good point. We have been asked to go by both administrations. The Iraqis have a political problem. That is not lost upon us. Most people in most countries don't want hundreds of thousands of foreign troops roaming around their country forever. So the Iraqis have been up-front with us. We want to continue the partnership, but it needs to be at a smaller level. They are absolutely right. I don't buy one moment that there is a movement in Iraq saying we will take 3,000, not 1 soldier more. I think what is going on here is there is, as Senator MCCAIN suggested, a number drives the mission, not the mission drives the number. At the end of the day, this 3,000 doesn't get any of the essential jobs done. It leads to 3,000 exposed. It leaves the thousands of civilians without the help they need. It leaves the Iraqi military in a lurch. There is no upside to this.

I would end with this thought: Let's get the missions identified and re-source them in an adequate way, and I think the country will rally around the President. I cannot think of too many Americans who would want our people to be in harm's way unnecessarily. If you leave one, you have some obligation to the one. Well, if you left one, you would be doing that person a disservice. Leave enough so we can get it right, and that number is far beyond 3,000.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to say in response to something Senator MCCAIN said, somebody in the military said to me: If we are not going to leave enough to do the job, we might as well not leave anybody there.

Of course, we don't want that to happen. There are a couple of alternatives here. One is that the 3,000 is not the number. Hopefully we will have clarification. It is more than that. In all our trips to Iraq, talking about repeated teams of leadership, never has there been anyone who said to us that we needed less than 10,000 American troops there to do this job. I want to repeat this; there is a kind of sleight of hand here. Maybe it is 3,000 here and a few more thousand tucked into the civilian workforce at the embassy and a few more somewhere in the special covert operators. If that is the game plan here, it is a mistake. We ought to see exactly how many troops are leaving there. It gives confidence to our allies in the region, particularly in Iraq, and it will unsettle our enemies, particularly in Iran.

Dr. Ken Pollack has a piece in the National Interest that is out now about this situation. He is concerned about the small number of troops that may be left there and agrees that there may be some Iraqis who might be pushing for a smaller post-2011 force with a more limited set of missions. Dr. Pollack says:

That would be a bad deal for the Iraqi people and for the United States. Our troops would be reduced to spectators as various Iraqi groups employ violence against one another. Moreover, if we have troops in Iraq but do nothing to stop bloodshed there, it would be seen as proof of Washington's complicity. If American forces cannot enforce the rules of the game, they should not be in Iraq, period, lest they be portrayed as contributing to the destruction of the country.

That is what we are saying.

The final point here is Dr. Pollack argues in this piece that the United States, if this is in response—giving the benefit of the doubt for a moment—to Iraqi political concerns, that the U.S. has the leverage to avoid this dangerous outcome. He writes:

America has the goods to bargain. The question is whether Washington will.

That is the question I believe my colleagues from Arizona and South Carolina are asking today: Will we bargain with our Iraqi allies that this is the problem to be able to work with them for another chapter to secure all we have gained together up until now?

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I appreciate your indulgence and yield the floor.

# RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 2:15 p.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 12:37 p.m. recessed until 2:15 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. CARDIN)

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# REMEMBERING SENATOR MARK O. HATFIELD

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, my home State of Oregon has many towering and majestic features, such as our iconic Mount Hood and our beautiful State tree, the Douglas fir. Senator Mark O. Hatfield, who passed away on August 7, stood head and shoulders above all of them.

Last night, the Senate passed S. Res. 257, a resolution in respect of the memory of Senator Hatfield. This afternoon, Senator MERKLEY and I, with colleagues of both parties, would like to reflect on the extraordinary legacy of our special friend, Senator Mark Hatfield.

For me, Senator Hatfield's passing this summer, just as it seems the Congress has become embroiled in a never-ending series of divisive and polarizing debates and battles, drove home that Senator Hatfield's approach to government is now needed more than ever in our country.

Senator Hatfield was the great reconciler. He was proud to be a Republican with strongly held views. Yet he was a leader who, when voices were raised and doors were slammed and problems seemed beyond solution, could bring Democrats and Republicans together. He would look at all of us, smile and always start by saying: "Now, colleagues," and then he would graciously and calmly lay out how on one issue or another—I see my friend, Senator COCHRAN from Mississippi, who knows this so well from their work together on Appropriations—it might one day be a natural resources question, it might one day be a budget issue or a health issue or an education issue, but Senator Hatfield had this extraordinary ability to allow both sides to work together so an agreement could be reached, where each side could achieve some of the principles they felt strongly about. They would not get